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The purpose of this thesis is to explain the role of information in the theory of the 
firm.  This provides a new perspective on how information impacts firm expansion and 
boundary.  Information helps a firm become more certain on how to direct the firm.  
Uncertainty is the opposite; it causes confusion and problems for the firm.  This thesis 
discusses two ways a firm can develop certainty.  The first is through experience and 
learning.  These may require time and effort.  The second is through expansion.  
Expansion increases resources and capacity for the firm to deal with uncertainty.  
Certainty is manifest as operational intelligence and stability.  Operational intelligence is 
based largely on how the firm operates and stability focuses on the current position of the 
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The purpose of this thesis is to explain the role of information in the theory of the 
firm.  In the context of this thesis, information is any internal or external data of value to 
the firm.  It is the learning curve of production, firm environment, teamwork, data, 
experience, and anything that increases information or familiarity for the firm.  
Information is also trade secrets, operating procedures, proprietary information, and any 
other information that gives the firm a competitive edge in the market and helps reach 
profit maximization.  It is the information that is distinct to the function of the firm and 
would jeopardize the market share of the firm if lost to a competitor.  Information can 
also serve as a competitive advantage for the firm, and most firms attempt to protect this 
information with great effort.     
Information helps explain why firms expand or choose not to expand.  In the 
literature review, the theories reviewed attempt to capture the broad range of concepts 
that seek to explain firm theory.  Each theory puts some emphasis on controlling 
resources.  The resource that is argued in this thesis is information.   
For the purposes of this thesis, entrepreneur will be used as a blanket term to 





will make the argument easier to follow and does not affect the basic argument.  
Similarly, we can substitute the idea of a corporation forming the firm.  Firms within this 
thesis are presented in a general term, but a firm can take the form of a limited liability 
company, limited liability partnership, sole proprietorship, general partnership, 
corporation, and various other classifications.  This is not an exhaustive list of what is or 
is not a firm, and for the purposes of this thesis, any firm is a business.  A business entity 
sells or produces goods or services for the market.   
A major focus of this thesis is expansion of firms. Expansion helps firms gain 
additional information.  As a firm expands operations, it incorporates resources that add 
information to the firm and also increase the overall capacity of the firm to handle 
information.  These resources range from accounting professionals’ knowledge to 
assembly teams, and even extend to raw and prefabricated materials.  The tradeoff 
between using the market and internalizing operations forms the firm boundary.  This is a 
make-or-buy decision often decided by upper management within a firm.  Hence, the 
firm boundary is the area of current operations, or more simply the area at which the firm 
ends operations.   
The make-or-buy decision is largely determined by uncertainty.  Uncertainty will 
be discussed at great length in this thesis, but for the moment, uncertainty is lack of 
information.  Uncertainty increases the firm’s likelihood of making bad decisions, 
delaying or preventing a firm from making operational decisions, increasing volatility for 
the firm, or possibly causing the firm to poorly allocate resources.  If the firm decides to 
outsource production because of uncertainty, then it accepts the inherent risks that come 





adding information and capabilities that help it reduce uncertainty.  Expansion offers the 
firm more resources and certainty.   
Certainty, in this thesis, is manifest as operational intelligence and stability, both 
of which are forms of certainty that allow the firm to operate with higher information.  
Increased operating intelligence is key to a firm being successful.  Essentially, this is 
more calculated decisions and better understanding of the firm in the marketplace.  This 
includes the external and internal environment of the firm, the capabilities of the firm, 
and potential opportunities for the firm.   
Stability is how well the firm can forecast future events.  For example, a firm may 
operate with high seasonal fluctuations.  If these fluctuations match the expectations of 
the firm, then volatility may be considered low even though the fluctuations are high.  
Fundamentally, stability is how closely aligned the expected operations and actual 
operations are by the firm.   
If the firm is poor at forecasting, then the firm has instability and will likely 
devote resources to stabilization.  This can be costly to the firm, as it tries to devote 
resources to deal with instability.  Volatility can occur from internal errors or problems 
created by the firm.  Also, volatility can occur from external sources, such as the market.  
Volatility can disrupt the physical and strategic operations of the firm.  The presence of 
volatility causes uncertainty for the firm.   
Uncertainty from volatility or poor operational intelligence by a firm adversely 
impacts the firm’s expansionary decisions.  In states of high uncertainty, a firm is more 






expansion poses to the firm such as increased costs or jeopardizing the survival of the 











The following subjects are discussed in the literature review “Theory of the 
Firm,” production efficiency, transaction cost, transfer pricing, and asymmetric 
information.  The ideas presented in this thesis focus on the role of information in firm 
development, behavior, and growth.  Information is key to firm theory because it is the 
basis to any decision made by a firm.  This will be discussed at greater length in the 
following chapters, but for this chapter, the focus is on developing information.   
Each article in the literature review has ideas that explain or abstractions that can 
be drawn about how information works in an economic setting.  Some of the ideas of this 
thesis derive from the articles through parallels or abstractive thinking that come from the 
original concept found in the article.  The focus for the literature review is to cover the 
material with accuracy and notify the reader of any parallels or abstractions that are 
necessary for the later chapters. 
Information is abundant in business.  It is developed through interaction, 
experience, perception, or any other way that gathers information.  One of the key 
arguments of this thesis is that information is used as the basis for decision-making.  





information can be obtained, some of which are discussed in the literature review.   
Production efficiency, when used comparatively, can be used to generate 
information.  The comparisons can be used as tools to help decision-makers in a firm 
choose how to direct the firm.  Transaction costs and transfer pricing each provide 
information to the firm that is unique to how the firm is operating and can serve as 
measures for basing comparative efficiencies. 1  Lastly, asymmetric information is 
concerned with having assurance even though there is a lack of information.  The 
important point being that even in the absence of information, a decision-maker has 
certainty in a likely outcome.  These ideas serve as some of the key ways a firm gathers 
information.   
Once again, how firms gather and use information is the basis for the theory of the 
firm being developed in this thesis.  We will discuss various qualities of information, 
such as reliable or unreliable, and also extend the idea to how it is interpreted.  These 
topics are discussed at greater length in the following chapters, but for the purposes of the 
literature review, ideas concerning information are presented in the literature as intended 
by the author, and then demonstrate how it is relevant to information.    
 
 
2.1 Theory of the Firm 
 
A unique feature of firm is that it uses coordination and control to produce an 
intended product.  The approaches to “theory of the firm” discussed range from 
neoclassical, institutional, and resource-based.  Within these schools of thought, the 
theories center around trying to explain why firms exist, what is a firm, or what are the 
                                                
1 The term efficiency in this thesis focuses on how well aligned a process or policy is 





limiting factors to a firm’s growth.  Information is key to a firm being successful, and 
firms pursue paths that allow for greater information.  These theories are important to 
economic theory because we interact with corporations and other business entities daily.  
Understanding why firms develop and why economic growth is limited is key to 
understanding how the free enterprise and world economic system functions.   
 
 
2.1.1 Wealth of Nations (1776) 
 
Adam Smith in “Wealth of Nations” (1776) addresses the benefits that 
specialization can have on production.  Specialization is a major component of firm 
theory because it can be an argument for why a firm exists.  Firms can specialize by 
organizing labor with a purpose to reduce errors or waste, and increase production speed.  
The basic concept is that a specialized worker is better at judging production 
requirements, able to produce more quickly, and less likely to make errors.  In the 
viewpoint of this thesis, specialization does two things: the worker is taught how to 
produce properly, and can offer efficiency recommendations for improvements.  
Specializing can be accomplished by reducing the task to the simplest process.  Smith’s 
theory is the basis for ideas involving production efficiency.  Production efficiency 
argues, similar to Smith, that workers who specialize are more efficient.  The argument is 
extended in production efficiency, in that the learning curve is the process to 
specialization.   
Smith argued that the production process should be grouped according to 
divisions of labor.  Within Smith’s framework, a division of labor is a narrow focus on a 





and the greater part of the skill, dexterity, and judgment with which it is any where 
directed, or applied, seem to have been the effects of the division of labor” (Smith, 1776, 
p. 1).  Within any given division of labor, the total production process should be divided 
amongst the laborers to the point that each portion of the production process is as simple 
as possible.2   
The benefits of this are twofold: increased production efficiency and 
specialization.  Production efficiency is where a firm eliminates any nonessential process 
from the production process.  This may also come in the form of better organization in 
order to accomplish production and expedite the process.  Specialization encourages the 
laborers to specialize in a specific area of the production process.  By allowing laborers to 
specialize increases the skill3 of the laborer to accomplish the task, and creates efficiency 
in the production process.  Smith argues that coordinating how and where each laborer 
specializes in production allows for higher production efficiency than if the effort is 
uncoordinated and nonspecialized.  As a result, production efficiency and specialization 
gained through coordination4 allows the producer to gain real economical savings and 
increases speed of production.   Although Smith never explicitly wrote his theory to be a 






                                                
2 Basically, the goal is to organize production so only essential inputs are present in the 
production process and that any nonessential inputs are reassigned to other areas of 
production or removed entirely.    
3 The idea is that the laborer becomes better at production as they work through the 
learning curve and develop skills. 





2.1.2 Nature of the Firm (1937) 
 
In Coase’s “Nature of the Firm” (1937) he theorized that firms play a larger role 
in the economic system than many of his contemporaries realized.  The common 
economic viewpoint was that natural forces largely control the economic system.  The 
norm was that these forces, supply and demand, are what guide resources within an 
economy.  The price mechanism is a manifestation of these forces and sets the prices of 
goods and services within the economy.  Under the price mechanism viewpoint, market 
participants naturally gravitate towards production that is most rewarding.  The influx 
and departure of market participants, as prices change, balances the economic system.  
Hence, the price mechanism autonomously directs the economic system.   
The price mechanism is the allocator of resources within the economic system, 
and allocates according to price and quantity.  Therefore, all resource allocation within an 
economic system is dependent on the price mechanism.  This means the system lacks 
“central control” and “over the whole range of human activity and human need, supply is 
adjusted to demand, and production to consumption, by a process that is automatic, 
elastic and responsive” (Coase, 1937, p. 387).  Coase challenged his contemporaries by 
suggesting that although those forces exist,5 a firm can supersede the price mechanism.   
Coase theorizes that at the firm level, the firm has the ability to control resources, 
and can supersede the price mechanism.  This is accomplished by controlling the 
allocation of resources through creation of an internal market.  Firms are able to do this 
through vertical/horizontal integration or developing through new operations6 that create 
                                                
5 Coase acknowledged the naturally occurring economic forces like the price mechanism, 
but sought to explain how these forces could be superseded by other economic forces. 





tools for the firm to control its resources.  Broadening operations makes the firm less 
reliant on the market and expands its production capability. 
The entrepreneur is key to the creation of a firm.  It is through innovation by the 
entrepreneur that a firm is created.  The firm develops from innovations by the 
entrepreneur or from the entrepreneur’s ability to apply the innovations of others to fill a 
need within the market (Schumpeter, 1993).  Innovation is a result of the information that 
the entrepreneur has developed and has discovered a way to market the idea.   
As a firm expands and integrates production via employees, equipment, 
businesses or anything that can advance the expansionary goal of the firm, it is also 
taking on additional resources.  These additional resources expand the firm’s private 
economy, which is controlled by the entrepreneur.  Because the entrepreneur controls the 
economy, the entrepreneur is free to direct resources to accomplish the desired 
production goals.  Production goals are the nature of the business and what it is producing 
to eventually sell on the market.   
Entrepreneurs may often have multiple roles within the firm such as organizing 
resources, providing leadership, and fixing operating issues (Schumpeter, 1993).  The 
presence and interaction of the entrepreneur may change over time and the roles of the 
entrepreneur may be distributed to individuals within the firm.  To preserve the 
terminology used by Coase, we will maintain the use of entrepreneur within this section, 
but it must be noted that innovation may not be the only role of the entrepreneur.  An 
entrepreneur leads, organizes, and sets the strategic course for the firm.  Oftentimes these 
roles are assigned to the President, Board of Directors, or whatever hierarchical body that 





firm may change over time.  The entrepreneur may assume the role of owner, manager, 
stockholding president, or sell the firm to another entity and cease connection. 
Sometimes, the entrepreneur remains with the firm and may hold one of those hierarchal 
positions previously mentioned.   
The entrepreneur is responsible for determining the most cost-effective method of 
production.  Throughout the production process, the entrepreneur faces the decision to 
either make-or-buy.  Internalizing production offers the benefit of reduced costs and 
increased capabilities for the firm.  The alternative is purchasing from a vendor on the 
market that is already producing the component.  If the entrepreneur elects to make a 
good,7 then the resources within the firm are directed to incorporate the process into the 
overall structure of the firm.    
Controlling resources gives the firm the ability to exchange goods within the firm 
without the influence of the external price mechanism.  The firm becomes subject to the 
price mechanism when selling products on the market and buying goods from a vendor.  
Hence, Coase emphasizes that there must be the distinction between “allocation of 
resources of a firm and allocation of resources within an economic system” (Coase, 1937, 
p. 389).  The open market may be efficient at allocating the overall need of society, but 
there are costs associated with the market that increases the cost of the good or service to 
the firm.   
“The most obvious cost of ‘organizing’ production through the price mechanism 
is that of discovering what the relevant prices are” (Coase, 1937, p. 390).  Knowing the 
                                                
7 If the entrepreneur elects to make the good, then the process is incorporated into the 
production process and operation of the firm.  Not all internalization activity is 





cost of production is key to a make-or-buy decision for the firm, but Coase explains this 
is not the only advantage of internalizing operations.  We will return to this idea of 
discovering relevant prices in the following chapter.   
The costs associated with the open market are search, bargaining, enforcement, 
information, and taxation.  These costs can be reduced through internalization into the 
organization of the firm.  Organizing is the first advantage a firm can use to supersede the 
price mechanism.  By creating an internal market, the entrepreneur overcomes the excess 
costs of using the price mechanism.   
The first cost of using the price mechanism is the cost of information.  Coase 
focuses on information as a cost of the market rather than the advantages that come from 
information, which will be discussed in later chapters of this thesis.  Coase noticed 
information on the market is sold at a premium.  For example, using a middleman8 to 
advise and to help resolve production needs increases the costs for the firm.  There are 
implicit and explicit costs to using the middleman.  An explicit cost first is the premium 
paid in order to get the desired good or service.  Other costs may be implicit, such as time 
spent in gather information.   
Searching is the next cost to using the market.  Searching is similar to 
information.  The time the firm spends searching takes resources away from production 
and represents a cost.  Coase explains a firm has higher costs associated with searching if 
it does not use long-term employment.  Contracts require bargaining that can be costly.  
Many short-term contracts likely have higher bargaining costs along with more search 
                                                
8 Suppliers, attorneys, accountants, and subcontractors sell information as the primary 





costs.  Long-term contracts, on the other hand, are done at inception or infrequently.9  
Furthermore, long-term contracts offer the flexibility to allow for ambiguity.  In other 
words, a long-term employment contract has the flexibility to direct employees to a more 
pressing matter if necessary, whereas a short-term contract may lack the flexibility and 
may require additional temporary employees or contracts. 
Enforcement is also an implicit cost of the open market.  Using vendors on the 
market has limited enforcement power.  The firm cannot direct the vendor’s resources or 
production activity to ensure the order is fulfilled properly.  If a firm is reliant on another 
vendor outside of the firm, it is a potential liability to the firm.  Even with a contract, the 
firm may be left with incomplete delivery.  The firm may have retaliatory power, but 
only to the extent the firm is made whole.  If production is impacted either from a late or 
incorrect order, it may impair client relations for the firm, which has consequences that 
may be difficult to rectify.  Ultimately, there is limited enforcement power when dealing 
with the open market.  Alternatively, the firm has greater enforcement power over 
production it controls.  Internalization offers assurance that the component in the 
production process is being produced timely and correctly. 
Taxation is another cost of the market.  As the firm begins to control more 
resources, it is able to exchange these resources between areas of the firm to accomplish 
the end product.  This internal market is not subject to the same regulatory restrictions as 
goods or services exchanged on the open market.  Sales tax is not required on intrafirm 
trade and the production process between production areas passes tax-free.  The firm will 
also be required to pay income tax when it sells to the external market.  This gives firms 
                                                
9 Long-term contracts may have the periodic bargaining issue where employees demand 





another unique power that helps reduce costs below the price mechanism.  Apart from 
lower prices, the internal market is not subject to the price wars that can occur on the 
open market.  Price rationing or bidding increase the cost to purchase goods or services 
on the open market.  Transactions within a firm are coordinated by means of transfer 
pricing.  Transfer pricing is often predetermined10 or set by upper management.  Upper 
management can control prices between areas of production.  Transfer prices can be 
helpful to assign proper costs and profits to each area of production.  Constricting the 
internal exchanges through predetermined prices allows divisions of the firm to work 
together toward a common goal rather than bid against each other to increase divisional 
profits.   
Coase explains there are limits to a firm’s ability to expand.  Expansion reaches a 
limit when there are no cost reducing benefits.11  The firm reaches a point it ceases 
expanding because the cost to produce equals the cost of purchasing on the market.  For 
example, the overhead cost might increase faster and disproportionally to the savings of 
producing internally.   
The other likely scenario is that the firm becomes too large for the entrepreneur to 
control.  Coase explains the firm reaches a point where “the entrepreneur fails to place 
the factors of production in the uses where their value is greatest, that is, fails to make the 
best use of the factors of production” (Coase, 1937, p. 394).  Wasting resources results in 
an increase cost to the firm that limits the ability for the firm to expand.  The entrepreneur 
                                                
10 Management may decide to set the transfer prices to cost, market price, or some other 
specifications such as for tax purposes.  Tax purposes will be discussed later in this thesis 
at greater length.   
11 Coase argues that as firms expand it will have diminishing returns.  A point will be 






may be unable to overcome poor allocation.  Hence, Coase theorizes that the firm ceases 
expansion at the point where the cost of organizing internally is equal to the cost of 
purchasing on the open market.   
 
 
2.1.3 Production, Information Costs and Economic Organization (1972) 
 
In "Production, Information Costs and Economic Organization," Armen Alchian 
and Harold Demsetz (1972) focus on defining the firm.  They focus on team production 
and contracts being the facilitators of firms.  In an economic system, a firm only controls 
a small portion of all resources within the economic system.  Resources are distributed 
through tacit or formally created contracts.  These contracts are built on the agreement 
that the “price [is] acceptable for both parties” (Alchian & Dementz, 1972, p. 777).  
Some contracts are between two parties12 without any relation.13  The two parties have an 
incentive to see the contract completed.  One party produces and the other party promises 
payment for the requested production activity.  It is possible that one party to hold both 
ends of a contract.  This is more common where a firm is requesting production from 
workers and also paying the workers for production.  This can create problems for the 
firm because it is holding both ends of the contract. 
The problem centers on the idea of metering.  For example, suppose an owner of a 
firm requests one of the employees to complete a given task.  The employee is paid 
throughout the entire task and is paid whether the task is completed timely or slowly.  
The employee is faced with the tradeoff between work and pleasure.  It is in the interest 
of the employee to shirk - avoid work.  Therefore, the owner of the firm must implement 
                                                
12 Contracts can be created between individuals, businesses, customers, etc.   





a means to enforce the employee to work on the production process.  Obviously, the 
employee in this case is subject to termination if the owner feels that the production level 
is inadequate.  If there are more than two employees, the owner may have a more difficult 
time distinguishing which employee is shirking.  One obvious problem is the lack of 
information.   
Alchian and Demsetz explain that monitoring becomes more difficult when team 
production is involved because of the difficultly assigning the problem to specific 
members of a team.  This is because “working as a team, individual inputs do not yield 
identifiable, separate products” (Alchian & Dementz, 1972, p. 779).  Rewarding the team 
based on production entices the team to “replace excessively shirking members” (Alchian 
& Dementz, 1972, p. 781).  This is interesting because even though the managers lack 
information, rewarding the team based on production diminishes the likelihood that a 
shirking worker could get away with shirking.  Although this approach may create 
disharmony between team members, it demonstrates clearly how changing arrangement 
can make information available.   
Alternatively, a specialist14 can be used to oversee team production.  A specialist 
offers more than just monitoring production.  Alchian and Demsetz recommend, “the 
specialist… receives...  residual rewards [based on production of] members of the team” 
(Alchian & Dementz, 1972, p. 782).  Paying the specialist according to production 
encourages them to organize individuals to maximize production potential.  Furthermore, 
a specialist is in a unilateral situation with team members, which increases intervention 
power with limited recourse.  This relationship is contractual between the specialist and 
                                                





the team members.  The contractual relationship is what binds the employees within a 
firm and the mechanism that enables them to work.   
Firms may be viewed as collection of contracts.  These contracts work together in 
team production to accomplish production goals.  Alchian and Demsetz redefine the firm 
using six characteristics.  The first is the firm must have coordinated production goals.  
The second is the firm must contract workers that are able to aid in the production goal.  
The third is there must be one individual or group that is central to all production 
contracts.  Fourth, a central individual or group must have the power to renegotiate 
contracts independently.  Fifth, that individual must uphold the contacts.  Lastly, the firm 
is a collection of contracts working toward a common goal through team production.  It is 
when a firm has these six characteristics that the firm is competitive in the market. 
 
 
2.1.4 A Resource-Based View of the Firm (1984) 
 
Birger Wernerfelt’s (1984) "A Resource-Based View of the Firm" builds off of 
some of the ideas presented by Edith Penrose about resources.15  Wernerfelt argues the 
definition of the firm should be expanded beyond what Armen Alchian and Harold 
Demsetz purposed and should include all resources of the firm.  Wernerfelt feels that all 
resources add either “strength[s] or weakness[es]  to a given firm” (Wernerfelt, 1984, p. 
172).  It should be noted that the resources encompass all the tangible and intangible 
assets, including things such a customer loyalty or any aspect of information.  The ability 
to control resources or substitute competitor’s resources allows for growth.  Hence, “the 
                                                
15 Penrose argued that human assets could grow over time.  Similar to the learning curve 
of production, a person undergoes a learning process that increases with management 





optimal growth of the firm involves a balance between exploitation of existing resources 
and development of new ones” (Wernerfelt, 1984, p. 178). 
Resources, therefore, are more important to the growth of the firm than the 
products produced by the firm.  Hence, the firm should put emphasis on protecting 
resources.  Protecting resources for the firm is very difficult because not all resources are 
easily identifiable.  As mentioned earlier, resources are completely encompassing16 for 
the firm, which makes retention more difficult.  The focus of the firm in protecting 
resources forms the firm boundary.   
 
 
2.1.5 Theory of the Firm as Governance Structure: From Choice to  
Contract (2002) 
 
In "Theory of the Firm as Governance Structure: From Choice to Contract," 
Oliver Williamson (2002) argues that firms seek to economize on transaction costs, just 
as Coase theorized, but focuses on governance.  In the previous article “Production, 
Information Costs and Economic Organization," the parallel was made that changing the 
incentive structure can change information.  This article takes a similar approach, but 
from a structural perspective.  For the purpose of this thesis, structure can inhibit or 
enhance the flow of information. 
Williamson’s theory is that through governance, a firm can reduce transaction 
costs.  Governance includes contracts held and created by the firm, but must also include 
private ordering and governance structure. 
Private ordering helps “reduce the cost of regulation” (Schwarcz, 2002, p. 321).  
                                                
16 Resources in this theory are everything on the balance sheet, employees, customer 





This is accomplished by allocating resources through market incentives created by the 
firm.  Traditionally, governance is viewed as how the firm is directed via the policies, 
operating procedures, or plans.  Williamson explains, “the attributes of the governance 
structure include incentive intensity, administrative control and contract law regime” 
(Williamson, 2002, p. 180).  Hence, within a firm, incentives and disputes are controlled.  
This control extends to contracts directing resources toward specified outputs.  This idea 
can be applied to information.  Information that is irrelevant to the duties of an employee 
should be removed.  For example, suppose a firm had a mechanic and an accountant.  
Their informational needs would be very different even though there may be some 
similar informational overlap.  This idea of designing the firm to control information is 
addressed further in the following chapters. 
There are two major advantages a firm gains through contracts and results in a 
competitive advantage.  The first advantage is asset specificity.  The higher the asset 
specificity, the narrower the focus is on a task of production.  It could be anything from a 
special tool to training an employee for a task that is unique to that part of production.  
With respect to this thesis, the firm is able to provide information to an individual that 
may not have the required skillset or narrows the information to only include the 
pertinent information, both of which are cost-effective in getting the desired outcome.   
Asset specificity allows the firm to increase complexity without increasing the 
need of the market.  The transaction costs that would normally be incurred with 
complexity are internalized and the cost of the transaction is below the cost of the market.  
As asset specificity increases, competitors of the firm will have greater difficulty 





match or imitate the process in some form.  This is critical if a firm wishes to maintain an 
informational competitive advantage. 
The other advantage is that a firm is able to overcome hazards that would have no 
easy solution on the market.  A firm uses contracts to overcome hazards more easily than 
without a contract on the market.  For those reasons, asset specificity and hazards are 
more likely to produce firms.  In contrast, where there is low asset specificity, the 
individuals will have greater advantage because there are lower barriers to entry and 
generally carry less overhead.   
 
 
2.2 Production Efficiency 
 
Comparing efficiencies is information that the firm can use for short-term or long-
term strategy.  It is likely in the real world that a firm could be faced with two or more 
ways to carry out any given task or process.  Production efficiency in the context of this 
thesis is concerned with how well the production process in general is aligned with the 
goals and direction of the firm.   
The reason for a comparative efficiency focus is that it can be used statically and 
also dynamically for comparative purposes.  A static comparison can be accomplished by 
comparing the efficiency of two processes that have similar outcomes.  A dynamic 
comparison can be used to build relations with other processes of production or even 
measure the process against itself over time.  Both are important because in decision-
making there can be unique advantages depending on the desired outcome. 
Production processes vary and a process deemed more efficient in total output 





for the firm can use comparative efficiencies to determine the desired path of the firm.  
An example is comparing how two different production processes create a different table.  
The first may use hand tools and the other heavy machinery; the first produces the table 
with an emphasis on craftsmanship or human labor and the latter focuses on machine 
labor.  Both will have different efficiencies in how they produce.  Even though they have 
different efficiencies, they excel in some or many aspects of producing the similar goods.   
The decision-maker can compare these efficiencies and pursue a path aligned with 
the goals of the firm.  Hence, if the firm desires to produce unique tables, it is unlikely 
that the firm would choose heavy machinery.  Even though heavy machinery likely has a 
much higher capability of producing tables quickly, it does not fit within the goals of the 
firm.  The main point to be made is that efficiencies can be compared in various ways as 
long as they are similar in purpose.   
Hence, a firm may consider higher efficiency to be less waste in the production 
process because the goals of the firm are to lower overall costs or increased profitability.  
Another option is the firm may wish to become more competitive by discounting the 
selling price to gain market share while maintaining profitability.  Whatever the reason, 
production efficiency is critical to decision-making. 
 
 
2.2.1 The Learning Curve and Competition (1973) 
 
The article "The Learning Curve and Competition" by A.  Michael Spence (1973) 





specializes production for the firm.  Specialization and production efficiency17 were 
discussed earlier in the thesis.  Continuing on with those ideas of the learning curve, 
added context is given to the decision-making of specialization.  Spence explains, “the 
short-run output decision is a type of investment decision” (Spence, 1973, p. 49).  To 
elaborate, an entrepreneur is faced with a decision to increase production efficiency; this 
decision is an investment because the entrepreneur is basing the decision on profitable 
expectations.   
Expectations are similar to sunk costs in that it takes time to recover or realize the 
investment of specializing.   The long-term benefits and expectations are that the learning 
curve will help gain production efficiencies or create advantages over market rivals.  
Spence argues that the cost of the learning curve declines over time.  Interestingly, not all 
learning curves are equal and the shape and duration varies.  A way to reduce the learning 
curve is to hire individuals familiar with the specific learning curve.18  Conversely, a firm 
that has passed through the learning curve may attempt to guard information regarding 
the skills and knowledge necessary in an attempt to maintain the advantage over others 
not familiar with the learning curve. 
The last major concept of the learning curve is how difficult is it to pass through.  
How long it takes to pass through determines if there is an advantage of knowing the 
learning curve.  If the learning curve is “either very slow or very fast, competition 
prevails because the entry barriers are low” (Spence, 1973, p. 68).  If the learning curve is 
fast, then entrants can easily enter the market and there is no real advantage to the 
                                                
17 Specialization and production efficiency concepts can be found in an earlier section, 
“Wealth of Nations” by Adam Smith (1776).   
18 These individuals may have technical training that is related to the production process 





learning curve.   
If the learning curve is slow, then a firm passing through the learning curve will 
have higher costs for a long period, which may make it less competitive.  This is because 
competitors may have lower productions cost by avoiding the costs of specializing.  
Another possibility is the specializing firm is a late adopter and the competition has 
already passed through the learning curve and is capitalizing on the benefits.   If a firm 
has specialized and none of the competitors have passed through the learning curve, the 
firm has a monopoly advantage and can maintain dominance until another firm passes 
through the curve or a substitute is found.   
 
 
2.3 Transaction Cost 
 
Transaction cost theory is important to this thesis because it provides a source of 
information that firms can use as a basis for decisions.  Oftentimes when comparing 
production efficiencies, transaction costs of a specific part of the production process can 
be isolated and compared with other possible processes as alternatives.  Basically, 
transaction cost helps the firm identify the cost of transferring goods in areas of 
production.   
A transaction cost is the cost of transferring goods or services “across a 
technologically separable interface” (Williamson, 1981, p. 552).   Within a firm, it is 
where the transfer of goods or services begins and ends in the production process.  There 
is a cost to the transfer that is either explicit or implicit throughout the transfer process.  
Additionally, this cost is necessary for the transfer to occur.  For example, purchasing an 





price of the apple and an implicit cost is the time required to go to the supermarket to 
purchase the apple.   
The first area of transaction cost is the overall structure of the firm.  It is the 
interaction between various operating areas of the firm and how they interact together.  
This would include the cost of using the market. 
The second area of transaction cost is operating activity dictating transaction cost.  
Whether the price mechanism or management direction, transaction cost has implied 
control over the path of production.  This area is concerned with the “efficient 
boundary.”19  Transaction costs in this area are mainly concerned with the make-or-buy 
decisions a firm faces. 
The third area of transaction cost area is how human assets are organized.  In this 
third category, transaction costs can “match internal governance structures with attributes 
of work groups in a discriminating way” (Williamson, 1981, p. 549).  In other words, 
transaction costs are incurred by enforcing and imposing the will of the firm.    
 
 
2.3.1 The Economics of Organization: The Transaction Cost  
Approach (1981) 
 
As explained in the introduction to this section, there are three main areas of study 
in transaction cost theory.  Oliver Williamson’s article, "The Economics of Organization: 
The Transaction Cost Approach" (1981), is mainly concerned with the efficient boundary 
of a firm and how transaction costs manage human assets.  One common element in both 
of these areas is that they have an implicit governing power.   
                                                
19 The term efficient boundary was popularized by Ouchi (1980) and is where a firm is 
able to realize increased or diminished production.  Coase uses a similar term “firm 





For Williamson, transaction costs form an efficient boundary of operation for the 
firm.  The efficient boundary is the current resources and production, the resources and 
production avoided, and the make-or-buy decisions of the firm.  Depending on whether 
the firm produces or purchases a good or service determines the firm boundary.  The firm 
boundary is where internal production ceases and the market20 fulfills the remaining 
production.   
The firm boundary is the static position of how the firm is currently functioning.  
Internal production has added benefits that may compel a firm with capability to capture 
the opportunity that internal production offers.  Williamson explains there are three major 
advantages to internal production.  The first advantage is having the ability to optimize or 
specify production needs in detail.  The second is having full control over disputes that 
arise in production.  Third, the relevant information regarding a dispute is obtainable.   
As a firm grows, interactions between divisions require additional management to 
handle the increasing number of transactions.  Even though there are advantages of 
internalizing the market, the firm will reach a point where it is too large to manage 
properly.  This is because transactions become so numerous that management is unable to 
handle the volume.  This is important because the firm’s ability to expand is directly 
linked to the information it can handle. 
Mismanagement and mistakes may lead to diminishing returns.  Firms that reach 
this point will have diminishing returns from the increased transactions.  The firm at this 
point will be producing internally at the same price to purchase on the market.  If the firm 
produces at a higher cost than the market price, the competitiveness of the firm is 
                                                
20 In this case, it is referring to an external market.  The internal market is the form of the 





reduced.  The reduction to the firm’s competitiveness limits further growth.  In other 
words, the size of the firm is limited by the diminishing returns due to an increased size 
of management (Sraffa, 1926).   
The other major governing power of transaction costs is the ability to manage 
human assets.  This is a power that is controllable by the firm, whereas the efficient 
boundary is unmanageable.  At the firm level, transactions have three attributes; 
“frequency, uncertainty and asset specificity.”21  The more asset-specific a firm becomes, 
the narrower the focus of production is.  For example, if a firm purchases a machine 
requiring special training to operate, that process increases asset specificity.  Higher asset 
specificity by the firm requires higher specialization of human asset.  Higher asset 
specificity increases performance of production, but may also come at a higher cost.  
Moreover, asset specificity is not limited to machinery; asset specificity may be exclusive 
to human capital within a firm.  Higher asset specificity can also be viewed as increasing 
information where the firm is trying to specialize.   
The more specialized an employee becomes, the less likely a suitable substitute 
can be used in production.  Determining how specialized an employee is for the firm can 
be done by assessing how firm-specific the employee is and how easily the employee can 
be metered (Williamson, 1981).  The more firm-specific production is by the employee, 
the more important the role of the employee is for the firm.  Additionally, the inability to 
meter increases with specificity.   
Williamson explains the degree to which the combination of these measurements 
determines the firm’s ability to govern the human asset.  Williamson argues that given 
                                                
21 These ideas were previously expressed in Williamson’s “Theory of the Firm” (1937).  





the nature of the transaction the “governance structures are tailored to the specific needs 
of the transaction” (Williamson, 1981, p. 568).  Tailoring the governance structure is 
another way a firm limits its boundary.   
 
2.4 Transfer Pricing  
 
A big component of the theory in this thesis is that firms try to guard information.  
It will be argued that transfer pricing is an example of how a firm can guard information.  
More will be discussed on this concept in the following chapters, but it is necessary to 
cover how transfer pricing creates autonomy and how information is guarded.   
Transfer pricing is the price at which a good or service is sold from one division 
to another under common ownership.  Goods exchanged between divisions are referred to 
as intermediate goods.  There are three ways to set the transfer prices of the intermediate 
goods between divisions: market-based price, cost-based price, and negotiated transfer 
price.  One of the strategies of transfer pricing is the ability to shift profit between 
divisions. 
Strategic application of transfer pricing can be used to increase profits for a 
division within a firm.  This strategy involves intervention by upper management to 
assign selling prices between divisions rather than allowing each division to determine 
prices.  The reason for this is that individual divisions may price for maximize profit at 
the division level rather than what would maximize profits for the firm.  For example, 
one division may sell to another division at a discounted rate with the purpose to shift 
profit to that division.  The purchasing division can use the purchased goods22 to bring 
                                                
22 The buying and selling is not limited to physical goods and can extend to services or 





about a higher profit margin in its area of production.  Shifting profits can be useful to 
lower tax costs for the firm.  If all the divisions in the sale of goods are within a single tax 
district, a transfer to shift profits has no higher realization of profit.  However, if there is a 
difference in tax rates between divisions, then the firm can have a higher profit margin if 
it shifts the profit to the division in the lower tax district.   
Transfer pricing is often studied for this ability to shift profits from higher tax 
districts to lower tax districts.  Although that is a very important concept of transfer 
pricing, it will not be fully discussed in this thesis.  The purpose of transfer pricing within 
this thesis is to expand on the idea of the advantages of a controlled internal market by 
upper management.  Transfer pricing has the unique characteristic of allowing passive 
independence.  Each area of the firm may operate autonomously without the need to 
consult.  Furthermore, transfer pricing restricts divisions from cannibalizing other 
divisions and limits disputes within the firm.   
Cannibalization could possibly occur when there is no set transfer price.  In a firm 
that uses profitability incentives, the divisions may seek to profit maximize by increasing 
the transfer price for the division buying the goods.  Unrestricted increases of transfer 
prices in an incentive based firm could cause the firm’s production to breakdown.  
Resolving this issue will likely require upper management intervention to set transfer 
prices.  Transfers pricing helps limit pricing disputes between divisions and are directed 
to upper management and not other divisions.  Additionally, transfer pricing helps 









2.4.1 On the Economics of Transfer Pricing (1956) 
 
In “On the Economics of Transfer Pricing,” Jack Hirshleifer (1956) addresses 
how transfer pricing can be used to achieve higher profits through eliminating 
competition between profit centers.  Hirshleifer explains that as firms23 expand, they 
create profit centers.  These profit centers within the firm work autonomously and trade 
with other profit centers or divisions through an internal market.  As mentioned at the 
beginning of this section, there are various ways to assign transfer prices.  Hirshleifer 
argues that the transfer pricing should be set to “maximize the profit of the firm as a 
whole” (Hirshleifer, 1956, p. 172).   
The problem is that profit centers are designed to work independently and are 
judged by net profitability.  Competition to capture profit can increase between divisions 
where there is only a final market.24  When only a final market exists and transfer prices 
are set by profit centers, profit centers may feel pressure or have incentive to increases 
profits by increasing its transfer price.  Although some may not consider asymmetric 
informational problems in firms, this thesis argues they exist and this is an example of 
such an occurrence.  The way a firm can overcome this problem is either better 
communication in firm, a new incentive structure, or as this thesis argues, by 
management control.  The advantages of management control are that information 
centralizes on management and there is less risk of information being leaked.  This is 
                                                
23 Hirshleifer uses corporation, but almost any other business entity applies. 
24 Sometimes a firm has multiple steps in the production process.  At any given step of 
production, there may be a market that will buy the goods produced by a division at the 
intermediate stage of production.  Goods at this stage may not necessarily be the main 
production goal of the firm, but are goods sold in conjunction with final goods.  Hence, a 
division in production that has an intermediate market can sell goods to both other 





discussed at greater length in later chapters, but for now, we will continue the Hirshleifer 
argument.   
Hirshleifer argues firms can still profit maximization even where there are no 
intermediate markets.  He argues that all of the profit centers except for the final division 
must be set to the “sum of the divisional marginal cost equal to the marginal revenue for 
the final market” (Hirshleifer, 1956, p. 175). 
Alternatively, if there are perfectly competitive intermediate markets for the 
intermediate profit centers, then transfer prices should be “market price” (Hirshleifer, 
1956).  If intermediate profit centers have a market to dispense of intermediate goods, 
then profit centers can produce according to the firm production schedule in addition to 
the intermediate market demand.  The existence of intermediate markets in the 
production process determines what transfer pricing method should be used by the firm.   
 
 
2.5 Asymmetric Information 
 
Asymmetric information is approached from two viewpoints in this thesis.  The 
first maintains that asymmetric information can be overcome through screening, 
signaling, or by developing information.  The other viewpoint is firms wish to control 
what information is dispersed.  In the section on transfer pricing, it was suggested that 
transfer pricing is a way to guard information by making units of the firm autonomous.  
This is important because in a transfer pricing setting, where there is high autonomy, it is 
easier for a firm to guard production information.  This is because only relevant 
information is distributed to production areas and there is less access to complete 





Protecting information is a competitive advantage for the firm and if lost, may 
result in a portion of the firm’s competitive advantage being lost.  More on this idea will 
be discussed shortly, but it is important to introduce the concept that protecting 
information is a major goal of firms.  The following articles in this section address how 
an individual can overcome asymmetric information even though the individual may lack 
the necessary information concerning the situation.   
Asymmetric information occurs when there is an imbalance of information, for 
example, a situation where two parties in an exchange have significantly different levels 
of critical information about the exchange.  The party with the higher levels of 
information has more leverage in the negotiation process.  This may lead to the 
uniformed party paying a higher price or being taken advantage of during the transaction.  
The lack of critical information between the parties may lead to future problems or even 
put one party out of business.   Critical information would be anything that would make 
one party act differently or wish a different outcome.  The presence of asymmetric 
information creates increased uncertainty for the uninformed party.  The following 
journal articles are some of the key ideas to understanding how individuals or firm can 
overcome asymmetric information. 
   
 
2.5.1 The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market  
Mechanism (1970) 
 
In the “The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market 
mechanism,” George Akerlof (1970) explains that asymmetric information can create 
problems in exchanges.  Asymmetric information problems arise when there is uneven 





an advantage for the party with greatest information and a disadvantage for the party with 
least information.  Akerlof applies the idea of this imbalance of information to a used car 
market.  In the example, the used car market has both good and bad cars.  The dealers of 
the cars know more about the quality of their car than the potential buyer.  Based on the 
quality of the car, the dealer is only willing to sell the car for its value or higher.    
The buyer, on the other hand, knows there are good and bad cars in the used car 
market.  The buyer has difficulty determining the quality of individual used cars in the 
market.  To hedge the risk of not knowing the quality of each car, the buyer assumes all 
cars are average and will only pay an average rate for a used car.  In this scenario, the 
dealers of the good cars are unwilling to let their cars go for sub-worth rate and the 
dealers with the bad cars are more than willing to sell their inferior cars because the 
average the buyer is willing to pay is more than the value of the car.   
Akerlof explains that the “bad cars drive out the good because they sell at the 
same price as good” (Akerlof, 1970, p. 490).  Furthermore, over the course of time 
through various iterations, the really bad cars drive out the “not-so-bad” within the used 
car market.  In the long run, many iterations of decreasing quality destroy the used car 
market.  Akerlof calls this example of the used cars the lemon principle. 
Akerlof argues that the lemon principle may be applied to employment.  The 
predisposition of the employer toward employee candidates in the hiring process makes 
the candidate more or less hirable depending on their individual characteristics.  This is 
mostly due to the employer being uncertain of the actual ability of the candidate.  In light 
of this problem, unbiased institutions offer credibility to the employers.  These 





help develop skillsets.  Once the skillset has been developed and learned by the 
individual, these institutions endorse the individual on their training.  Hence, these third 
parties may be useful in assuring the employer of quality and creditability. 
Because there is asymmetrical information, firms can increase their chance of 
success by building creditability and assuring quality.  This can be accomplished through 
building brand recognition or offering guarantees.  These business practices build trust 
between the seller and buyer.  In turn, the market is more confident it will not be a market 
of “lemons.”   Equally, where asymmetric information is extreme, a lack of trust can 
destroy the market and consumer confidence.   
 
 
2.5.2 Job Market Signaling (1973) 
 
Michael Spence (1937) builds off some of the same ideas presented by Akerlof in 
“Job Market Signaling,” particularly the idea of uncertainty.  Spence uses the example of 
a firm hiring an individual.  At the interview stage, the firm can only speculate on the 
capabilities of the individual.  Even after hiring the individual, if the position is 
complicated, there may be a period of time the capability of the individual is unclear as 
they progress through the learning curve.  This prolongs the uncertainty of hiring the 
individual for the firm.  Based on this scenario, when a firm hires an employee for a 
skilled position, the firm is making an investment in the individual in hopes that the 
employee’s skillset meets the demands of the job.  Hence, the employee is an investment 
for the firm.    
Spence explains the firm recognizes the uncertainty of the applicant’s skillset and 





information25 on the job candidate to determine how well the individual is suited for the 
job.  Some of the data collected by the firm is “unalterable,” such as race, and other data 
is “alterable,” such as education.  The alterable data points are signals to the hiring 
employer that the individual has or does not have proper qualifications for the job.  
Throughout the many iterations of hiring, the firm begins to build beliefs on what signals 
are most useful for the firm.  The firm becomes more specific about the qualities needed 
for the job and “the employer's beliefs may drive certain groups from the market and into 
another labor market” (Spence, 1973, p. 366).   
Overcoming asymmetric information requires either signaling or collecting 
information to overcome uncertainty.  For instance, in the example of the hiring process, 
the employer is acting as a buyer.  The employer is uninformed on the true ability of the 
applicant.  The applicant is trying to convince the employer that he or she has the 
necessary qualifications for the job, either by developing a strong skillset or experience.  
The applicant demonstrates credibility to the employer through obtaining strong skillsets 
or experience, which help to overcome the employer’s lack of assurance.   
The nature of this problem is rooted in the presence of uncertainty from 
asymmetric information.  The way to overcome uncertainty is to gain information.  
Joseph Stiglitz explained that a firm can “screen,”26 which is somewhat described above 
when the employer is specifically asking for certain qualifications.  Screening is different 
from signaling because the employee is actively determining capability rather than rely 
on a signal from a third party.   
                                                
25 This information may include: education, race, previous employer, experience, 
criminal record, and any other data that may be useful.   
26 Screening helps employers identify qualified candidates more easily during a hiring 





2.5.3 Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and  
Ownership Structure (1976) 
 
Michael Jensen and William Meckling’s article “Theory of the Firm: Managerial 
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure,” (1976) may feel misplaced, but I 
only intend to elaborate on a small portion of this article that deals with asymmetric 
information and transaction cost.  The principal-agent problem is where one party is 
trying to get another party to fulfill a task.   
The principal-agent problem begins with the contractual obligation of one party 
“to perform some service on their behalf which involves delegating some decision-
making authority to the agent” (Jensen & Meckling, 1976, p. 5).  Jensen and Meckling 
argue that if “both parties [in] the relationship are utility maximizers, there is good reason 
to believe that the agent will not always act in the best interests of the principal” (Jensen 
& Meckling, 1976, p. 5). 
The principal can choose to guard against the adverse interests of the agents 
through bonding27 and monitoring.28  These help protect the principal, but result in an 
explicit and/or implicit cost to the principal.  Also, Jensen and Meckling explain these 
costs reduce the overall welfare of the principal.  The loss of welfare for the principal is 
referred to as the residual loss because the allocation and distribution of the principal’s 
resources are impacted.  The sum of these costs incurred is the cost of the agency 
relationship.    
In the agency relationship, the principal must pay for monitoring in order to 
                                                
27 Bonding restricts the agent through a non-compete disclosure.  This reduces the 
potential damage a knowledgeable agent could have in competing against the principal 
employer. 
28 Some of the monitoring tools used are security system, auditors, controller, etc.  The 





assure the agent is carrying out the principal’s request.  Monitoring costs are based on the 
idea that added information will reduce the shirking of the agent.  This remains an 
asymmetric problem, where the agent will make the most of the transaction and choose 
pleasure over work.  In order for the principal to get the desired results from the 
exchange, monitoring is needed to enforce the agent to work.  Monitoring increases 











Of all the theories of the firm we discussed in the literature review, only one that 
was reviewed sought to explain why firms exist.  The purpose of this thesis is to explain 
the role of information in the theory of the firm and offer a new perspective on why firms 
exist.  In Coase’s “Nature of the Firm” (1937), he explained why firms exist and what 
limits firm expansion.  This thesis challenges Coase’s idea that firms exist to lower 
transaction costs.  Transaction costs are not the best way to describe firm development 
from two points.  The first is that not all business decisions or production paths are 
focused on lowering transaction costs.  The second is that when firms reduce transaction 
costs, it is because of information.   
Reducing transaction costs are often dependent on the firm acquiring enough 
information to recognize the opportunity to reduce the cost.  Firms are limited to what 
information they can develop, and as Coase pointed out, firms reduce transaction costs, 
but only if it is beneficial for the firm.  This is because the firm often considers the 
implicit and explicit costs that may be incurred in order to reduce transaction costs.   
These two points are best explained in the following example.  Suppose a firm is 





costs.  The explicit transaction cost savings may be great, but the potential implicit costs 
and risks may prevent the firm from choosing that production path.  Ultimately, whether 
the firm decides to build the factory comes down to the sum of information collected by 
the firm.  Based on the information, the firm is certain or uncertain about the potential 
outcome of building the factory.   
Certainty and uncertainty are basic ways to describe the confidence of an 
individual or group with the information obtained.  Information that is difficult or 
impossible for the firm to develop or obtain has high uncertainty.  Coase’s transaction 
costs all have a naturally higher level of uncertainty because they are market transactions.  
Market transactions are costly because of inherent uncertainty.  Reducing the uncertainty 
through internalization helps to reduce the uncertainty, and as a result, lower transaction 





Coase argued search costs would be higher if the firm did not use long-term 
contracts (Coase, 1937).  Searching requires effort and resources that takes employees 
away from their regular duties.  Searching is expensive because of uncertainty.  
Uncertainty causes costs to increase because it is unclear what the firm should do.  It does 
this by prolonging the search process until an adequate level of certainty to make a 
decision is achieved.  We learned that signaling helps overcome uncertainty, but 
signaling only serves as an indicator of ability.  There are many other factors that are 
more difficult to signal, such as personality.   





employee is in charge of the hiring process for a firm.  If the manager charged with hiring 
was perfectly informed on all the applicants’ skillsets and how they could be integrated 
into the firm, then the decision would likely be instantaneous and the hirer could match 
the right candidate to the job.  This is because the hirer has certainty of information and 
knows who would be the best person for the job.   
The search process would be quick with certainty.  It would require little time for 
completion and would result in a negligible cost.  We can assume that someone perfectly 
informed would make an instant decision and conversely, a completely uninformed 
person would require a lengthy span of time to make a correct decision.  The correlation 
would likely resemble some linear relationship, where we would expect information 
expediting the process. 
A more realistic example that demonstrates how firm certainty is key to driving 
down costs is when a group of individuals work together for a long time and know each 
other’s capabilities.  If this group is given a task to complete, it is likely the group could 
easily assign duties because the group as a whole is well aware of each other’s 
capabilities.  Over the course of time, as a team becomes more familiar with other team 
members’ skillset, uncertainty is reduced and search costs decrease.  The group still 
incurs search costs for the firm, but the cost is reduced because of increased certainty.   
These examples show that as certainty increases, search costs tend to decrease.  
Internalization is a key component to increasing certainty for the firm and reducing costs.  
Certainty is gained through experience with the firm and team members, and in many 
ways, this relationship extends beyond the search process.  A more suitable way to 





associated with their job, they increase and contribute to the overall certainty of the firm.  
Furthermore, there is a learning curve to teamwork and a logistical learning curve to all 
the components of the firm.  Certainty adds vital operational intelligence and can result in 
lower costs.   
Another aspect of why a firm tries to overcome uncertainty is to gain the 
advantages of efficiency.  Firms that specialize are more knowledgeable of how to 
optimize performance in its specialty and able to manage cost more effectively.   
Uncertainty is a major factor that drives up search costs.  This may explain why a 
firm makes large investments in training new employees or emphasizes the importance of 
continuing education to long-time employees.  For a firm to be successful, it must train or 
help develop employee skillsets for the unique duties of the firm.   
Employees are an actual part of the firm and if the firm recognizes this, it has the 
power to cultivate and craft the employee’s skills to maximize their utility for the firm.  
Alternatively, the firm would struggle at training applicants for a job they may not get.  
Internalization is naturally the best option for the firm because it offers the firm the 
ability to precisely train employees for the skills necessary to complete the tasks required 
by the firm.  This precision decreases uncertainty and increases stability. 
Firms invest in data with the purpose to gain information to overcome 
uncertainty.  These investments, such as developing a client list, can either be bought or 
created by the firm through effort.  This becomes part of the operational intelligence, 
which will be discussed in the next chapter, but is within the overall knowledge of the 
firm. 





to internalize where possible.  Uncertainty increases the time required for decision-
making.  By internalizing, the firm develops a learning curve that helps the firm create 
essential competitive information and also reduces search costs.  This serves as a 
competitive advantage for the firm in the marketplace because the firm is more 





Bargaining costs are the next area Coase mentioned in his theory.  Coase argued 
that firms are able to lower transaction costs through long-term contracts.  Long-term 
contracts are more flexible and can lack specificity.  Lacking specificity is a way for the 
firm to use uncertainty favorably. 
First, let us return to the “used car” example by Akerlof to explain why 
uncertainty is bad in a free market exchange.  Akerlof argued that in a market, if there 
were no way for the customers to determine quality of goods in the market, the market 
would be susceptible to failure.  In this example, Akerlof warned that if information were 
asymmetrical, then the bad cars would crowd out the good cars.  This is because the 
buyers are only willing to pay for an average-quality car to hedge the risk of paying a 
high price for a low-quality car.  In the example, car dealers knew the value of their car 
and were only willing to sell their car for anything equal to or higher than the value of the 
car.  Hence, if the going rate was below the value of the car, then the dealers refused to 
sell the good cars.  In this example, only bad cars are sold because of the customer’s 
uncertainty. 





an industry.  Imagine if the buyers knew the value of every car.  The buyers would be 
willing to only pay up to the intrinsic value of the cars and possibly some value for the 
dealer.  It is likely this very informed consumer base would crowd out any profit for car 
dealers.  This would be a huge problem and lead to the car supply collapsing.  This is 
because each dealer has different operational costs and the prices would vary between all 
the dealers even when sold at cost.  Even the dealer with the lowest cost would be unable 
to expand and take control of the market because it would likely increase costs resulting 
in diminished competitiveness.  The only way complete transparency could work is if all 
the dealers had uniform expenses or one seller.  Hence, it is in the interest of dealers to 
maintain a level uncertainty over actual costs because it could destroy profit.   
Just as a car dealers wishes to maintain uncertainty of information with 
customers, it is also an advantage for the firm to maintain a level of uncertainty over what 
contribution is made by each employee.  By issuing long-term contracts, the firm is able 
to employ an individual and direct the production of that individual.  A lack of 
transparency becomes more favorable for a firm as the individual becomes more useful in 
production.  This is because the individual lacks the ability to know their true value to the 
firm and would likely expect to be paid for usefulness.  The lack of specificity in 
contracts is favorable for the firm because it helps maximize profits.  This is because the 
firm has an individual that is more qualified and has developed a stronger skillset than a 
similar individual on the market.  In other words, individuals within the firm are 
customized to their role.  Hiring an individual outside the firm to do the same tasks as a 
long-time employee is initially a higher cost to the firm because it requires extra 





not to say that all employees are underpaid, but it does suggest that the firm has an 
advantage when determining wage.   
Uncertainty with employees is a major advantage for the firm because the 
individual is crafted and formed to meet specific needs of the firm.  This is favorable for 
the firm because the employee can develop utility for the firm at a disproportionate rate 





Coase argued that a firm has limited control over the external market.  This 
transaction cost provides control if internalized.  However, enforcement is typically 
viewed as something that raises costs for the firm.  In the principal-agent problem, it is 
implied that expansion increases enforcement costs for the firm.  The idea is the firm 
must invest in methods that compel employees to work.  For example, a manager of a 
paper company leaves town for the week.  If the office has no enforcement measures and 
the employees know there are no enforcement measures, the employees will choose to 
play instead of work.  The principal-agent problem is a major concern for firms because 
enforcing this relationship can increase costs and make the firm less cost efficient.   
Enforcement ensures better control over production, that the project is done 
correctly and timely.  Even with an added cost, the benefit to ensure that production is 
done properly may be worth the cost.  This would explain why a firm would expand even 
if expansion increases enforcement costs.  Even with rising enforcement costs, as firms 
grow, there is a natural increase of bargaining power over employees.  This is because 





individual leaves the firm, it has less impact to the overall success of the firm.   
Returning to Coase’s argument, he explains that enforcing a market transaction is 
more costly.  The idea is that the contractor-agent problem becomes the principal-
contractor problem.  Enforcement of a market contract is much more difficult and 
monitoring is limited.  Legal action and payment for completion of contract are the extent 
of the firm’s monitoring ability.  If a firm contracts with another firm on the market and 
the contract fails to be completed, some recoupment is possible, but it is likely that not all 
implicit damages can be recouped.   
The extent to which a company can recoup damages is only to the extent that the 
law allows.  Recoupment is generally29 very easy for explicit losses.  However, the 
implicit damage from a failed contract may not be easily quantified.  For example, a 
seamstress is making a wedding dress for a bride’s wedding day.  The seamstress 
contracts with a fabric seller for a specially requested fabric by the bride.  The seamstress 
specifies when the fabric is needed and the fabric seller is late.  The seamstress has no 
way to complete the dress for the bride.  The dress has no value to the bride if the dress is 
delivered the day after the wedding.  The seamstress can sue the fabric supplier for the 
lost revenue (explicit).  However, there are also implicit damages that may be very hard 
for the seamstress to prove such as the bride bringing bad publicity to the seamstress.  
Future customers for the seamstress may be lost because the bride’s day is ruined.  The 
results are real damages to the seamstress for being reliant on the market.   
Given the risk of enforcing market contracts in the context of the previous 
example, it would be in the best interests of the firm to internalize.  A firm can guard 
                                                
29 Typically, pain and suffering are difficult to prove and may be unlikely that a firm 





against the inherent risk of a market contract through internalization.  It is difficult in 
some situations for a firm to anticipate whether a contract will fail.  If firms can 
anticipate failure, they will not make contracts.  Hence, the firm is internalizing not 
because of the transaction cost, but rather to reduce uncertainty.  Through internalization, 
a firm is able to gain certainty over the situation that would not be possible using the 
market.   
 
 
3.4 Information  
 
When Coase argued about the transaction cost of information, he focused on 
information sellers. 30   He argued that information sellers charge a premium for 
information that would be easily accessible through internalization.  Internalization 
would provide the firm with relevant prices.  If we look at information in this context 
under uncertainty, it could be argued that the firm has more than relevant prices to gain 
through internalization.  Internalization adds many other areas of information aside from 
prices.  Expansion grants the internalizing firm access to a complete array of information.  
This can range from information of a new group of customers to trade secrets that can 
help the buying firm.  The benefits go far beyond eliminating the information sellers.   
Information is vital to overcoming uncertainty.  In the context of this thesis, 
information is any internal or external data of value to the firm.  It is the learning curve of 
production, firm environment, teamwork, data, experience, and anything that increases 
information or familiarity for the firm.  Information is also trade secrets, operating 
                                                
30 In “Nature of the Firm,” Coase (1937) focused on information purchased from 
specialists.  These specialists or middlemen can be eliminated through internalization.  
Information in this thesis focuses more on information as a resource rather than a cost to 





procedures, proprietary information, and any other information that gives the firm a 
competitive edge in the market and helps reach profit maximization.  It is the information 
that is distinct to the function of the firm and would jeopardize the market share of the 
firm if lost to a competitor.  Information helps the overall operational intelligence of the 
firm, which helps to reduce uncertainty.  Information also can serve as a competitive 
advantage for the firm, and most firms attempt to protect this information with great 
effort.    
Firms protect information in an attempt to keep competitors uncertain on how and 
what serves as the firm’s competitive advantage.  A firm protects this information 
through internalization.   Internalization limits outlets where information could be lost.  
Internalization helps reduce the risk of leakage by having control over information and 
production process.  Reliance on other vendors in the market may come at the cost of 
sacrificing trade secrets or strategy.   
There are several ways a firm can protect competitive and essential information 
such as using internal controls.  Another protective measure is a non-compete clause for 
employees who are well informed of the overall process.  A non-compete clause legally 
restricts a former employee from competing directly with a former employer.  Evidence 
of firms using these approaches is abundantly evident.   
Expansion helps to protect information by isolating employees’, other than 
management, from accessing large amounts of information about the firm.  Hence, by 
design, upper management is the only holder of all information (see Appendix).  Isolation 
can be accomplished by creating divisions that limit a nonmanagement employee’s 





prevent some employees from gaining sensitive proprietary information.  These barriers 
are either physical, such as separate locations, or intangibles, such as limiting the duties 
of the employee to short interactions with the production process.  By using transfer 
pricing, the firm can be more confident information is not spread easily.  As the firm 
protects its information, it is increasing the certainty it remains competitive and ensures 





The last transaction cost that Coase discussed is taxes.  Coase hypothesized the 
ability to circumvent taxes is a major factor that leads to firms expanding.  He argues 
reducing transactions costs are accomplished through creation of an internal exchange, 
where the firm is able to exchange goods tax-free.  Although this argument is true, 
business-to-business goods that are not final goods are often sold without sales tax.  The 
consumer often pays the sales tax.  It would largely depend on if the firm is buying goods 
for further production or end use in order to capture the benefit theorized by Coase.  
Many of the other jurisdictions outside the United States use the value-added tax.  In this 
case, it could potentially be more advantageous to buy rather than produce depending on 
the cost to produce.  This is because value-added tax is charged at each interval of 
production and the producer must pay this tax. 
However, income tax strategies are different and firms using the “check the box 
regulation” can lower their overall tax liability by electing how they wish to be classified.  
Some firms use this regulation to shift profits offshore into lower tax districts through 





strategies that firms can use, it can take a great amount of effort for firms to exploit tax 
loopholes that may be temporary.  Firms must be stable and certain that pursuing these 
strategies are worth the effort because tax policies and tax strategy can change.   
Another aspect of taxes that make the exchange fall under the scope of 
uncertainty is that taxation is a forced exchange between government and the firm.  Even 
though it is a forced exchange, firms attempt to maximize profit by minimizing tax 
liability as previously mentioned. 
Taxes naturally have a shroud of uncertainty.  There are legal, unscrupulous and 
even illegal ways a firm can reduce tax liability.  Sometimes there are mistakes.  Whether 
the mistake is unintentional or intentional, the shroud of uncertainty sometimes makes the 
transaction unclear.  The nature of taxes creates high levels of uncertainty and both 
parties have different levels of information.  The firm, however, interprets the required 
exchange and decides what to pay based on the information.   
Furthermore, because of uncertainty, firms are able to approach taxes properly or 
dishonestly.  Whether the taxes are done legally or illegally is up to the firm.  The 
government holds the power of consequence.  The government can audit the firm and 
verify the accuracy of the information and impose consequences if the information is 
incorrect.  Nevertheless, the firm remains in a fixed exchange with the power to make the 
first move.  Even under tax audit, the firm controls the information.  Thus, the evaluation 












In this chapter, we will develop a theory of the firm using information.  To do 
this, we will first examine certainty and uncertainty and how they relate to information.  
Then we will discuss how expansion develops information.  The chapter concludes with 
discussing operational intelligence and stability.  Both operational intelligence and 
stability are inherent traits of a firm and used to describe the firm from two broad 
measures.   
 
 
4.1 Certainty and Uncertainty 
 
In Coase’s hallmark paper “The Nature of the Firm,” (1937) he argues against the 
economic perspective of Professor Knight.  One topic discussed is the role uncertainty 
has on firm development.  Professor Knight (1921) argues the presence of uncertainty 
within the marketplace means it is not always clear what the market wants or does not 
want.  Hence, the entrepreneur is willing to bear the risk and forecast the needs of the 
market.  Under this system, Knight argues “the confident and venturesome assume the 
risk or insure the doubtful and timid by guaranteeing to the latter a specified income in 





individuals within an economic system and are able to forecast the needs of the market.  
Coase rebuttals Knight on three fronts: some contracts are created without forecasting, 
coordination would still be necessary without uncertainty, and Knight fails to “give a 
reason why the price mechanism should be superseded” (Coase, 1937, p. 401).  
Unsatisfied with Knights argument, Coase then sought to explain the firm development 
through transaction costs.  Even though Coase dismisses Knight’s approach in explaining 
uncertainty in firm development, Coase acknowledges, “it seems improbable that a firm 
would emerge without the existence of uncertainty” (Coase, 1937, p. 392).  This thesis 
continues some of the ideas of both of these economists.   
Coase was correct in observing that firms wish to save money and in many cases 
do internalize, but this fails to explain the cases when a firm does not try to lower 
transaction costs.  Such a case may be to protect information or the expansion required 
does not match the firm’s operational goals.  Furthermore, we discovered transactions are 
based largely on information.  Hence, this is why it is necessary to develop a theory of 
the firm based on information.  We will discuss this theory according to two perspectives.  
The first is the perspective of the entrepreneur or decision-maker(s) and assign a level of 
certainty.  If the entrepreneur has high information regarding the area of business, then 
they would likely have high certainty.  If they have low information, it would mean 
uncertainty.  The second perspective is from the firm.  This is an abstract way to apply 
this idea and is almost as if the firm was a machine.  If the firm is functioning properly 
and has great human assets, then it is likely the firm is operating with certainty.   If the 
firm is running poorly, then it has uncertainty.   





the firm.  We assign the information level to the two perspectives, entrepreneur and firm, 
because they describe how well the firm is doing.  Uncertainty does not necessarily mean 
a firm will fail or is near the end, it just means that operations are vulnerable.   
Uncertainty comes in two forms, internal and external.  Both internal and external 
can be applied to the two perspective.  Internal means that future events or even how to 
accomplish a task are currently difficult or impossible.  Hence, much of what is necessary 
to overcome is experience.  Uncertainty is having no prior or statistics of the past 
experience and has no basis to develop probability (Knight, 1921, p. 233).  Uncertainty is 
being unaware and unable to anticipate future events and outcomes.  Uncertainty and 
certainty is the framework of this theory and as firms shift between certainty and 
uncertainty.  Additionally, the capacity of the firm to grow increases with certainty and 
shrinks with uncertainty.   
 
 
4.2 Expansion Is Key to Developing Information and Stability 
 
A firm often starts as an idea by an entrepreneur.  The entrepreneur believes there 
is a need not being met in the market.  Hence, the entrepreneur develops a way to 
produce that good or service for the market.  This idea could have been developed from 
countless ways, such as schooling or experience, but comes down to application of 
information collected by the entrepreneur.  This is very important for this new idea about 
firm theory because the entrepreneur is basing the decision to start a firm on information 
collected.  Also, the information that has been collected suggests the market wants what 
the firm is selling. 





should be in a better position to anticipate his own wants than the producer to anticipate 
them for him, but we notice at once that this is not what takes place.  The primary phase 
of economic organization is the production of goods for a general market, not upon direct 
order of the consumer” (Knight, 1921, p. 240).  Previously, when we discussed Coase, he 
suggested that firms supersede the price mechanism.  Therefore, if the entrepreneur is 
able to produce demand, then the entrepreneur can supersede demand and dictate 
consumer wants.  This is accomplished through operational intelligence. 
 
 
4.2.1 Operational Intelligence 
 
Operational intelligence is the first of the major traits of a firm and has been 
alluded to throughout this thesis.  It is the collection of information held by the firm.  It 
encompasses all data held by the firm, experiences, and knowledge of the workers.  It 
also extends to how well the firm executes goals and strategy.  It includes things such 
things as communication and the physical infrastructure.  Operational intelligence also 
helps the firm recognize how to protect itself from internal and external threats.  
Operational intelligence also helps direct the firm so the firm is not adversely harmed.  
Operational intelligence can also be good in some areas of the firm and poor in other 
areas.  Depending on how the firm is overall can either increase or inhibit the firm’s 
ability to excel. 
As we have seen, operational intelligence is many things, but it all comes back to 
being based on information.  Operational intelligence is how proficiently the firm is 
operating.  We will cover a few examples to show how it is based around information.  





because of communication restrictions.  This firm would have lower operational 
intelligence.  Another example is a firm that has highly trained employees and keeps 
these employees informed and educated on the firm’s goals and direction.  This example 
suggests the firm has good operational intelligence.  Suppose a firm has gathered large 
amounts of data on market research and knows how to interpret the data.  This firm has a 
strong area of operational intelligence.   
A firm can have a competitive advantage over competitors because of operational 
intelligence.  A competitive advantage occurs when a firm may have certainty regarding 
how to allocate resources and market participants outside of the firm are uncertain.  If the 
market participants are uncertain, then the firm has a competitive advantage until the 
information is lost to the market.  For example, suppose a firm developed a sophisticated 
product and only the firm knows how to produce it.  The firm will have an operational 
intelligence advantage as long as the idea is not lost or replicated.    
Protecting information is critical to the success of the firm.  An example 
demonstrates this idea well.  Suppose a firm has a very high profit margin and customers 
discovered this high profit margin.  The customers would likely pressure the firm to 
lower the price of the good.  The customers may even pressure the firm to a zero profit 
position.  Profit provides liquidity and future growth opportunity for the firm.  Regardless 
of the opinion about profit margin, this idea that a firm could lose competitive advantage 
through leakage of information is apparent.  As Riley and Hirshleifer point out “there is 
also the possibility of unintended dissemination, achieved by espionage or monitoring on 
the part of information-seekers-possibly leading to countermeasures in the form of 






It is important to note that information is still disseminated to the market by the 
firm such as marketing products or services, but a firm with has low leakage of 
information is assumed to have greater control over information.  A firm can even design 
the physical or political structure of the firm to limit information loss.  The basic point of 
controlling information is that a firm can maintain a higher operational intelligence when 





Stability is the other major trait of the firm.  It includes things such as external 
factors that cause instability or accurate forecasting that promotes stability.  Much of 
what determines stability is how well a firm can anticipate future events and adjust or 
avoid these events through operational intelligence.  Hence, a stable firm is able to 
prepare and carry out a plan according to expectations.    
 
 
4.3 How Expansion Increases the Capacity of Operational  
Intelligence and Stability 
 
Operational intelligence and stability increase from expansion because it adds 
more experience and knowledge, which increases the capacity of the firm to handle 
business.  When internalization occurs, the purchasing firm now has access to strategy 
and information relative to the purchased firm’s market.  With this information, a firm 
may have clarity on how to reduce costs in existing areas of operations to opportunities 
that the internalized firm recognized prior to acquisition.  This is because information 





Hence, in an internal market, transaction costs are less likely to be driven up by 
impairment, which is a form of uncertainty.  The firm is able to reduce costs through 
certainty gained.  As previously explained, the certainty gained is either operational 
intelligence or stability or possibly both.  These two areas are necessary for expansion to 
occur. 
Added information protects the firm.  To view this concept abstractly, not all 
uncertainty is equal.  For example, two CEOs may have very different experiences with 
the market.  Suppose an event happens; one CEO having experienced a similar event 
prior to the new supposed event was able to anticipate the risk.  The other CEO has no 
prior experience that would help with the upcoming event and is left with uncertainty 
about how to manage the new event.  
The other major way internalizing helps a firm is being able to control inputs in 
production.  Internalization is a controlled economy for the firm and there are various 
things a firm can do within a controlled economy that would not be possible if the same 
transactions occurred on the market.  Controlling the economy means a firm can control 
resources, internal prices, trade, and depending on contracts, alter production 
assignments. 
Once the firm has expanded, it now controls aspects of operations that were 
internalized.  Interestingly, Knight argued, “uncertainty could be reduce through 
consolidation” (1921, p. 260). This may explain why a firm is able to increase certainty 
during financially rough times by firing nonessential personnel.  Knight’s argument of 
consolidation reduces uncertainty; expansion is similar to consolidation in principle.  





eliminates the need for external sources.  Also, it is within the bounds of the argument 
that a firm would use operational intelligence to eliminate whatever is hindering the firm 













In this chapter, the factors of expansion and what limit expansion are discussed, 
followed by an overview of how these factors work together in determining whether or 
not the firm is likely to expand.    
 
 
5.1 Factors of Expansion 
 
5.1.1 Operational Intelligence  
 
There are two major factors that determine the quality of operational intelligence.  
These factors are the quality of information efficiency and the capability of management 
to properly use that information.  Both of these aspects of operational intelligence help 
the firm develop certainty that is not necessarily based on expansion.  However, 
developing these may lead to the firm being able to further expand.   
Information efficiency goes beyond traditional accounting data collection.  This 
includes the intangibles of brainstorming to having homogeneous integrated software 
system.  It is the accuracy to which information can be transmitted to management about 
the overall awareness and position of the firm.  For example, suppose an assembly line 





small modification.  Further suppose that the modification to the machine would be 
relatively cheap and the increased output would meet the market demand for the product.  
If the worker is unable to share this information with decision makers, it may take a long 
time for the decision makers to recognize the opportunity or, possibly, it may never be 
realized.   
Information efficiency also incorporates the quality of information.  If the worker 
cannot convey the message properly and uses esoteric terminology, management may be 
unable to recognize the opportunity.  A firm that can convey ideas properly to decision 
maker’s has better chances of determining the quality of information.   
The capability of management was alluded to, but goes beyond recognizing 
opportunity.  It extends to training management on the firm’s specific market and 
working as a team.  A manager may be highly capable, but if burdened with nonessential 
tasks, he may miss opportunities.  For example, a firm uses handwritten reports rather 
than a computerized system and the report are collected and complied by the manager.  
The manager is wasting time and effort that could be saved through automation.  
Assuming that the firm could bear the financial cost of a computer system, it is not hard 
to imagine that the manager is wasting time, money, missing opportunities, and lowering 
the overall efficiency by not using computer technology.   
In brief, the quality of the firm’s operational intelligence is determined by the 
combination of these two elements, information efficiency, and capability of 
management.  Both of these assist in proper allocation of resources, directing the firm to 






5.1.2 Ignorance, Misinformation, Incompetence 
 
Furthermore, it helps management direct the firm away from hazards that could 
damage the firm.  Three areas that work against operational intelligence are ignorance, 
misinformation, and incompetence.  In general, these areas all reduce the quality and 
ability to make proper decisions.  Ignorance may be the thought of as an individual or 
firm that is unfamiliar.  This could be due to new responsibility that will require time to 
adapt and familiarize with the role.  Uncertainty can be overcome through experience and 
training that help the individual pass through the learning curve to reduces ignorance.   
Misinformation can occur from restricting information.  Although isolating areas 
of the firm can help reduce leakage, it also can be a source of problems.  When divisions 
within a firm are unaware of the overall production goal of the firm, each division is 
focused on its own profit maximization.  This may be in the form of incentives or 
structures that cause individuals or divisions to cheat or pose moral hazard issues to the 
firm.  This may not be in harmony with the overall goals of the firm.  Each member of 
the firm has a limited perspective of their role within the firm.   
Misinformation may arise from the intentional barriers set to divide divisions.  
Information that is sent to upper management may be specifically tailored to the division 
rather than the firm.  If management of a division is incapable of distinguishing between 
good for the division and good for the firm, problems are likely to arise.  As 
misinformation builds, it impairs decision-making and increases uncertainty for the firm.  
This can result in problems that lead to cannibalization of divisions. 
The last area is incompetence.  This includes the unwillingness to become more 





Unwillingness may occur when management or individuals are stubborn to evolve with 
the direction of the firm.  This may include an individual’s resistance to adopt technology 
or even act in the best interest of the firm.  Leakage of information can also cause 
problems because the firm can lose its competitive edge.  The more departments in a firm 
that exchange specific information, the higher the chance of information leaking to 
competitors.   
Incompetence may also be the inability to understand.  This may be from a lack of 
proper training on how to do a job, language barriers between employees, or even the 
inability to think critically about the firm’s needs.  In many ways, the overall governance 
structure, policies, and personnel naturally restrict or enhance the flow of information 





Stability increases certainty for the firm.  Stability increases as the firm’s ability 
to accurately forecast the needs of the market, the needs of the firm, anticipate volatility, 
and how to allocate the resources of the firm from operational intelligence.  Even if there 
is an occurrence of market turbulence, if a firm is able to anticipate shocks and 
fluctuations, it can be considered stable.  Another aspect of stability is the financial 
soundness and integrity of the firm.  A firm that is operating with high risk and threat of 
insolvency is less likely to be considered stable.  Stability serves as a major key for a 















5.1.4.1 Volatility: External to the Firm 
 
Volatility within the market is a significant reason to keep firms from expanding.  
Speculation and forecasting are estimates of the future.  A firm has little control over the 
market and is subject to the volatility that occurs in market interaction.  For example, a 
market that has constantly fluctuating prices for a good or services means that one or 
more resources in production is in an unstable state.  This could be anything from a 
machine breaking down to shipping problems.  Firms often operate better if stabile.  A 
firm may not expand if it is in an industry that is extremely difficult to forecast.  These 
businesses may be more reliant on vendors to assist in production in an attempt to 
maintain separation from volatility, but by doing so the firm is setting a firm boundary.   
External volatility can manifest itself in three ways: market forces, technology, 
and government.  Even if all of these inducers of volatility are external to the firm, they 
can still have significant impact to the firm.   
Market volatility pushes well-established firms into conservative decisions even if 
volatility is minimal and unlikely to have significant impact to the firm.  Market volatility 
induces panic and fear.  Firms do what they must to stay in business and fear can prevent 
the firm from taking any actions that can jeopardize its solvency.  This brings up an 
interesting dynamic of a potential firm relationship; upper management wants to keep 
their job and shareholders want greater return.  Sometimes these motives run parallel, but 





For example, during the most recent economic crisis Warren Buffet said “You 
make your best buys when people are overwhelmingly fearful” (Das, 2013).  Buffet was 
referring to the financial crisis as a situation that induced panic and he was very candid 
about buying during the volatility.  Buffet likely had high certainty throughout the 
volatility and was able to make purchases in a buyer’s market.  Hence, a point to be made 
is that being able to forecast with certainty negates volatility.  Continuing on with the 
example, shareholders may have certainty in a direction the firm should move.  The 
shareholders may pressure upper management of a firm to expand during volatility 
because they see the opportunity.  Conversely, upper management may be very hesitant 
and uncertain and refuse to do anything that could create risk for the firm.   
Risk may be viewed differently between shareholders and upper management.  
Risk for shareholders may result in an increase or loss of future earnings, whereas for 
upper management, the risk may result in a bonus or not having a job.  If this is the case, 
it suggests that upper management may tend to focus on personal impact such as job loss 
or lower pay that may come from risky decisions.  Hence, the firm may make 
conservative decisions even with the pressure from shareholders.  This implies that both 
production and market volatility are enough to keep a firm from expanding and is a 
barrier to future growth. 
It should also be noted that market volatility could influence decisions for the 
firm.  It may be anything from over purchasing supplies to having multiple suppliers for 
the same supplies.  Essentially, firms must hedge against market volatility because of 
having less control over suppliers.  Inversely, if the firm expanded operations and bought 





those supplies for the firm.  If not incorporated, any transaction beyond the firms control 
has the potential to encounter volatility.   
Technological changes are another source of volatility.  A systematic change in 
technology can completely alter or destroy industries.  For example, the newspaper 
industry has gone under significant changes from technological advancements.  
Continuing on with the newspaper industry example, the consumer delivery methods 
have changed and anyone can report the news.  There are numerous options that never 
existed for consumers to get news.  All of these technological changes forced news 
outlets to adapt and face new competition. 
The government is another source of systematic change that can cause significant 
volatility for a firm.  Laws and regulations can change how a business operates.  For 
example, a coal power plant may be severally restricted on how it burns coal, or worse, it 
can be shut down because of pollution concerns.  Although this may be a controversial 
example, it is meant to show how legislation can impact a business or even change the 
landscape of an industry.   
Sometimes external volatility can have multiple sources simultaneously.  A great 
example of this type of volatility is the most recent financial crisis where there was 
market volatility and government volatility.  When Lehman Brothers went bankrupt, the 
banking industry as a collective was hit hard.   As other banks began to show signs of 
weakness, the federal government intervened to calm and restore public confidence.  
Wells Fargo, Dimon & Blankfein, JP Morgan Chase, and Goldman Sachs were all 
insistent that they neither wanted nor needed TARP money as a result of the financial 





industry problems is unclear, but the government required them to take TARP money to 
stabilize the economy.  In this example, you have one industry where some banks are 
impacted by the market, some impacted by government intervention, and others impacted 
by both.   
 
 
5.1.4.2 Volatility: Internal 
 
Internal volatility is often associated with poorly allocated resources.  Coase 
explained that “diminishing returns [due to] management or rising supply prices” restrict 
expansion (1937, p. 396).  Although, mismanagement can cause production problems and 
cause internal volatility for a firm, internal volatility is more encompassing.  Some of the 
ways that a firm experiences internal volatility are production problems, scandals, 
information loss, language barriers, and poor management decisions. 
Production problems may result from poor coordination between divisions or 
areas of operations.  Although separation is used to protect information, if management 
fails to coordinate and establish a way to communicate, then the firm will have 
production problems.  These separations can be physical or intangible such as policies.  
For example, bottlenecks may occur when a firm is trying to coordinate production over 
vast distances.  Bad logistics can stifle production and cause volatility to increase costs 
for the firm.  Production volatility is especially dangerous for a firm because it increases 
overall costs and can cause problems for the rest of the firm down the production chain.  
Suppose a firm produces computers.  Each division produces one component of a 
computer.  The divisions send the components to the next assigned division.  If 





out, “production in general takes time so that firms need to make detailed forward plans 
for the supply of commodities without the benefit of forward commitments to buy on the 
part of consumers” (Bauer, 2005, p. 5).  Hence, bottlenecks can further exacerbate 
problems for the firm because delaying the production of goods for uncommitted 
consumers may further diminish possible sales.   
Alternatively, if the problem is near the end of production, then the previous 
divisions continue producing and the affected division may be required to hold excess 
inventory.  In this case, bottlenecks increase the costs of production, storage, and waste.  
Firms that are prone to volatility issues, whether it is production or any others problems 
within the firm, have higher risk.  Hence, risk can limit expansionary attempts by the 
firm.   
Scandals can be another source of internal volatility.  Whether the scandal occurs 
in the firm or another firm, because of interactions, the firm may have problems.  For 
example, an accounting firm has high interaction between its clients.  Suppose one of the 
clients held by the firm was investigated for fraudulently conducting business.  It is 
extremely likely that the accounting firm will come under extreme scrutiny by the law.  
Even if the accounting firm can immediately prove that it did everything in its power to 
do a thorough and lawful audit, the accounting firm will still come under scrutiny by the 
law and public.  This external scandal would likely bring high levels of uncertainty about 
the operation and finances of the accounting firm.  The uncertainty of the outcome can 
force the firm to be conservative.  Hence, the result of the scandal at another firm brought 
uncertainty to the firm even though the accounting firm was diligent in practice.   





be losing data or losing a key employee.  Losing information is a big problem because it 
could impact the firm’s relation to customers or increase competition.  Similarly, losing 
key employee is potentially more threatening to the firm because the former employee 
has information and can be an asset for a competitor.  When both aspects of losing 
information are lost to competitors, then the competitive advantage is greatly diminished 
or nonexistent.   
Language barriers are also another source of internal volatility.  If there are 
language barriers and no way for employees to communicate, then the firm can have 
volatility.  Although we tend to think of language barrier such as dialect, it also extends 
to training.  Suppose that a hospital hires a new emergency room assistant.  If one day, 
the doctor asks for a specific tool and the new assistant does not know which tool the 
doctor is describing, then there could be serious problems.  Firm language exists, and if a 
firm fails to train employees on specific terms, it can result in problems. 
Lastly, management’s poor decisions or lack of competence can also impact the 
stability of the firm.  Management can poorly allocate resources, assign duties 
inefficiently or hire the wrong people.  Many of these may come to mind when we think 
of poor decisions.  An example that may not be so apparent is missed opportunities.   
Oftentimes we would expect that a competitor failing would create a vacuum that 
would be quickly filled with the failed firm’s competitors, but this is not always the case.  
A firm may miss the opportunity.  Suppose there are three firms “A”, “B”, and “C” 
competing against many other firms in an industry.  The difference is that “A”, “B”, and 
“C” tend to compete head to head more often and have similar market share.  Suppose as 





During this process, “A” is unable to see the potential and does nothing.  Although the 













In this chapter, we will apply the ideas from the previous chapter and determine 
whether a firm is likely to expand or not given the conditions of the environment.  
Certainty assumes that the firm has operational intelligence, stability, or both.  
Uncertainty assumes that the firm has volatility, lacks information, or both.  It is even 
possible that a firm has a combination of certainty and uncertainty.  Figure 1 illustrates 
the relationship31 between certainty and uncertainty.   
 
 
6.1 Overview of the Conditions of Expansion 
 
6.1.1 Quadrant I - Strategic Expansion 
 
In this quadrant, the firm is more likely to expand because it has good operational 
intelligence and is stable.  This is the ideal situation for expansion because the firm is 
able to more accurately anticipate outcomes from operational decisions.  Firms in this  
                                                
31 I would like to suggest that Figure 1 is also applicable in explaining how entrepreneurs 
develop.  An entrepreneur within the context of operational intelligence (understanding 
market demand) and stability (financing accessibility) explains why some individuals are 
entrepreneur and other are not.  Within the context of Figure 1, it makes more sense of 






Figure 1.  The relationship between certainty and uncertainty expressed in terms of 
Stability and Volatility versus Misinformation and Operational Intelligence. 
 
quadrant are more likely to be able to take on large financial obligations potentially 
required for expansion.  Also, the firm can more easily recognize opportunities.  Whether 
the opportunities recognized are potentially lowering transaction costs or increasing 
market share, upper management is able to consider the likelihood of success and benefit.  
 
 
6.1.2 Quadrant II - Conservative Expansion 
 
In this quadrant, the firm is less likely to expand because the firm lacks clarity.  
Expansion is risky and lacking clarity accentuates the riskiness of expansion.  Even 
though the firm is in a stable state, the uncertainty arising from a lack of information may 
cause the firm to temporarily refuse to expand until information is gained or developed.  





investment and financial commitments.  In this quadrant, the firm sets the firm boundary.  
It is likely that the firm maintains the firm boundary until it is able to develop or gain 
better information.   
 
 
6.1.3 Quadrant III – Long-Term Static 
 
In this quadrant, the firm is unwilling to expand.  The risk from volatility and 
lacking information makes any expansion highly risky.  The firm remains in this state 
until the firm is unable to anticipate volatility or develop operational intelligence.  In this 
quadrant, the firm sets the firm boundary.  It is likely that the firm remains with the 
current boundary until it develops information or there is greater stability. 
 
 
6.1.4 Quadrant IV - Opportunity Expansion 
 
In the last quadrant, the firm is similar to quadrant II in that expansion may be 
temporarily refused, but with respect to volatility.  The firm may be forced to wait until 
the volatility has dissipated.  If the firm does decide to expand, it is because the firm has 
clarity to recognize opportunity.  However, it should be noted that not all volatility is 
similar and the intelligence must be specific to the opportunity.  In this quadrant, the firm 













In the previous chapter, “Overview of Firm Expansion”, we discussed how 
certainty leads to firm expansion.  Uncertainty, therefore, limits expansion.  A firm’s 
inability to expand is linked to volatility or issues such as lack of proper information.  
Ultimately, the firm has limited expansion ability due to these issues and the firm 
boundary is determined.  I would like to clarify that the firm boundary is not permanent 
and may change over time.   The boundary can change according to the firm’s ability to 
manage volatility or develop information.  The firm may increase or decrease in size due 
the market environment or where the firm is on its lifecycle.  The firm boundary may 
change as the firm gains operational intelligence, experiences stability, or both.  
Consequently, because the firm boundary can change, there is a distinction between 
short-term and long-term period where the firm may remain static because of the varying 













The role of information is essential to firm theory.  Both uncertainty and certainty 
do an excellent job describing the state of the firm.  Information explains why firms 
expand or cease expansion.  It describes the dynamics of how a firm functions and how 
decisions are made.    
The desire to overcome uncertainty cannot be understated.  Uncertainty can cause 
a firm to make poor decisions and allocate resources wastefully.  Certainty counteracts 
the paralysis of uncertainty and helps the firm make better and more informed decisions.  
Certainty also helps the firm optimally allocate resources.  A firm with high certainty, 
operational intelligence, and stability will continue to expand.  A firm with uncertainty, 
instability, and a lack of information will cease expansion and establish a firm boundary.    
Expansion can increase certainty to the operational intelligence and stability of 
the firm by adding resources.  The firm naturally generates these forms of certainty 
through experience or expansion.  Expansion increases resources for the firm and the 
capacity to develop certainty.  Another potential benefit of expansion is more control 
over the total production process resulting in the firm becoming less reliant on the 





intelligence increase the firm’s ability to gain market share, develop a competitive 
advantage, and maximize profits.   
The dynamics of a theory of the firm based on certainty and uncertainty is 
interesting because it offers a broader perspective of the firm in its current operation and 
position in the lifecycle.  It helps to explain the motives of why a firm wishes to gain 
certainty, from an economic and strategic perspective.  It also helps explain why firms 
cease expansion or make conservative decisions.  For these reasons, a more diligent look 
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